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Abstract
A class of preference domains is proposed: sequentially dichotomous domains. On any
sequentially dichotomous domain, the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001)) is sd-strategy-proof. In addition, any sequentially dichotomous domain is maximal
for the probabilistic serial rule to be sd-strategy-proof.
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1 Introduction
The random assignment problem (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) deals with the situation
where n indivisible objects are to be allocated to n agents, each agent receiving exactly one
object. Each agent reports a strict preference on objects to a planner and then the planner assigns
a lottery to each agent according to some prescribed (random assignment) rule. Examples
include allocating houses to residents (Shapley and Scarf (1974)), working tasks to workers
(Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)), and college seats to applicants (Gale and Shapley (1962)).
Essentially we can assign whatever lotteries to the agents. However, we want the lotteries
specified by the rule to be good in some sense. Since agents are reporting ordinal preferences
on objects but assigned lotteries on the objects, we need to extend the ordinal preferences on
objects to preferences on lotteries before evaluating lotteries. A standard approach is to adopt
the stochastic dominance extension (or sd-extension), which declares that a lottery is at least as
good as another if the former (first-order) stochastically dominates the latter according to the
ordinal preference on objects. Under the assumption that agents be expected utility maximizers,
the sd-extension is equivalent to that an agent prefers a lottery to another if the former delivers
∗I thank Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng for their endless encouragement and detailed suggestions. I also
thank Atsushi Kajii, Takashi Kunimoto, Jingyi Xue, Olivier Bochet, Jordi Masso, Herve Moulin, John Weymark,
and participants of the Workshop of Mechanism Design at Singapore Management University.
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an expected utility that is at least as high as the amount delivered by the latter with whichever
the Bernoulli utility that represents the agent’s preference on objects. In this sense, sd-extension
can be seen as a cautious approach.
With sd-extension, several properties of a rule are defined. The first deals with efficiency.
A rule is sd-efficient1 if it always specifies a random assignment which can not be Pareto im-
proved. The second deals with incentive compatibility. A rule is sd-strategy-proof if reporting
the true preference always delivers a lottery that is at least as good as the lottery delivered by
any misrepresentation. The last deals with fairness. A rule satisfies equal treatment of equals
if whenever two agents report the same preference, they get the same lottery. We say a rule is
acceptable if it satisfies all three properties.
In the literature there are essentially two random assignment rules: random priority rule (Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998)) and the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001)). The random priority rule is the uniform randomization on serial dictatorship rules. It
is sd-strategy-proof and treating equals equally, but not sd-efficient2. Quite a few papers are de-
voted to understanding why the random priority rule is sd-inefficient and under what conditions
it becomes sd-efficient, including Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), Kesten (2009), Manea
(2008), and Manea (2009).
The second rule, the probabilistic serial rule (PS), is sd-efficient and treating equals equally,
but not sd-strategy-proof. Relatively, why the PS rule is not sd-strategy-proof and under what
conditions it becomes sd-strategy-proof is largely neglected. The only paper in this line, as far
as the author’s knowledge, is Kojima and Manea (2010). However they are essentially dealing
with the so-called ”large assignment problems”, that is each object has sufficiently many copies.
For the baseline model discussed in the beginning, we still don’t know much. To fill this gap,
the current paper proposes a class of preference domains and shows that on such domains the
PS rule is sd-strategy-proof. We call them sequentially dichotomous domains. In addition, each
of these domains is shown to be maximal for the PS rule to be sd-strategy-proof, i.e., not a
single preference can be added into a sequentially dichotomous domain while the sd-strategy-
proofness of the PS rule is preserved.
The current paper contributes to the literature from another point of view. The literature of
random assignment comes with many impossibilities. It starts from Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) who proved that there is no acceptable rule on the universal domain. Then this impossi-
bility is strengthened to single-peaked domains by Kasajima (2013) and then to single-peaked
domains when all preferences have a common peak by Chang and Chun (2016). According
to these impossibilities, it becomes quite pessimistic that we can find a reasonably restricted
preference domain on which there is an acceptable rule.
Liu and Zeng (2016) introduce the restricted tier domains and show that a connected (Sato
(2013)) domain which admits an acceptable rule must be a restricted tier domain. To define a
restricted tier domain, an ordered partition on object set is fixed such that each block contains
at most two objects. Then a preference is admissible if it observes this ordered partition. In
other words, an agent is supposed to say only which one he likes more between two objects that
1Henceforth, we add prefix ”sd-” to emphasize that the corresponding property is in ex-ante sense and it’s
established with respect to the notion of stochastic dominance extension.
2Throughout the paper we assume that n > 4. For the cases when n < 4, the random priority rule is sd-efficient.
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are contained in the same block. So, normatively speaking, this result should be treated largely
as an impossibility, as noted in their conclusion. In this line of the literature, the result in the
current paper is probably the first possibility result.
To define a sequentially dichotomous domain, we need some preliminary definitions. We
say a partition on the object set is a direct refinement of another if from the latter to the former
there is exactly one block that breaks into two smaller blocks and all the other blocks are inher-
ited. Then we say a sequence of partitions is a path if it starts from the coarsest partition, ends
at the finest partition, and along the sequence each partition is a direct refinement of its previous
one. In other words, a path plots a way to differentiate objects by sequentially dichotomous
divisions. Given a partition and a preference, we say this preference observes this partition if,
for every pair of blocks in this partition, every object in one block is better than every object in
the other. Then a collection of preferences is said to be a sequentially dichotomous domain if
we can find a path such that a preference is included if and only if it observes every partition
along the path.
It is worthy noting that a sequentially dichotomous domain satisfies minimal richness, i.e.,
every object is found the top of some admissible preference. In addition, the size of a sequen-
tially dichotomous domain is quite large. Given the number of objects being n, a sequentially
dichotomous domain contains 2n−1 preferences, exactly the same size as the single-peaked do-
main.
Surprisingly sequentially dichotomous domains are related to the literature of ”Condorcet
domain.” 3 A preference domain is a Condorcet domain if majority rule applies without Con-
dorcet circle. Classical papers in this literature include Black (1948), Black et al. (1958), Abello
(1981), Fishburn (1997), Fishburn (2002), and so on. An excellent survey is by Monjardet
(2009).
It turns out that each sequentially dichotomous domain is a maximal Condorcet domain.
In addition, the size of a sequentially dichotomous domain is the largest in a class of maximal
Condorcet domains. This class is called the symmetric domains, requiring that whenever a
preference is admissible, its total reversal is also admissible.
The structure of sequentially dichotomous domains is found already described by Danilov
and Koshevoy (2013), who describe such a structure much more abstractly and from instead the
view point of operational researches.
The sequel is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Then the
third section defines sequentially dichotomous domains. The fourth section shows sd-strategy-
proofness of the PS rule on a sequentially dichotomous domain. The fifth section presents
the maximality result. Finally the last section comments on the uniqueness of the sequentially
dichotomous domains. Omitted proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 Model
Let A ≡ {a, b, . . . } be a finite set of objects and I ≡ {1, 2, . . . , n}, n > 4, a finite set of
agents. We assume |A| = |I| = n throughout the paper. Each agent i is equipped with a strict
3I thank Herve Moulin and John Weymark for suggesting such a relation.
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preference Pi on A, i.e., a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on A. Let P
denote the set consisting of all strict preferences over A. The set of admissible preferences is a
setD ⊆ P, referred to as the preference domain. Thus, P is referred to as the universal domain.
Given4 P0 ∈ D and a ∈ A, let rk(P0), k = 1, . . . , n, denote the k-th ranked object according
to P0. For all a ∈ A and P0 ∈ P, B(a, P0) denotes the upper contour set of a according to P0,
i.e., B(a, P0) ≡ {x ∈ A|x P0 a}. A preference profile P ≡ (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Dn is an n-tuple of
admissible preferences.
Let ∆(A) denote the set of lotteries, or probability distributions, over A. Given λ ∈ ∆(A),
λa denotes the probability assigned to object a. A (random) assignment is a bi-stochastic
matrix L ≡ [Lia]i∈I,a∈A, namely a non-negative square matrix whose elements in each row
and each column sum to unity, i.e., Lia > 0 for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A,
∑
a∈A Lia = 1 for all
i ∈ I , and ∑i∈I Lia = 1 for all a ∈ A. Evidently, in a bi-stochastic matrix L, each row is
a lottery, i.e., Li ∈ ∆(A) for all i ∈ I . Let L denote the set of all bi-stochastic matrices.
Agents assess lotteries according to (first-order) stochastic dominance. Given P0 ∈ D and
lotteries λ, λ′ ∈ ∆(A), λ stochastically dominates λ′ according to P0, denoted λ P sd0 λ′,
if
∑k
l=1 λrl(P0) >
∑k
l=1 λ
′
rl(P0)
for all 1 6 k 6 n. Analogously, given P ∈ Dn, we say an
assignment L stochastically dominates L′ according to P , denoted L P sd L′, if Li P sdi L
′
i for
all i ∈ I .
A rule is a mapping ϕ : Dn → L. Given P ∈ Dn, ϕia(P ) denotes the probability of agent i
receiving object a, and thus ϕi(P ) denotes the lottery assigned to agent i.
A rule is sd-strategy-proof if for every agent, her lottery under truth-telling always stochasti-
cally dominates her lottery induced by any misrepresentation, according to her true preference.
Formally, a rule ϕ : Dn → L is sd-strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I , Pi, P ′i ∈ D, and P−i ∈ Dn−1,
ϕi(Pi, P−i) P sdi ϕi(P
′
i , P−i).
3 Sequentially Dichotomous Domains
This section defines the sequentially dichotomous domains. However, before we present the
domains, several preliminary definitions are needed.
A partition of the object set A is a set of nonempty subsets of A such that every object a in
A is in exactly one of these subsets, i.e., A ≡ {Ak ⊂ A : Ak 6= ∅} such that
⋃
Ak∈AAk = A
and Ak ∩ Al = ∅ for all distinct Ak, Al ∈ A. A typical element of a partition is called a block
and denoted Ak ∈ A. We denote the collection of all partitions of A by A and define a binary
relation, called direct refinement, on A. A partition is a direct refinement of another if there is
exactly one block of the latter partition broken into two smaller blocks in the former partition
and all the other blocks are inherited; formally:
Definition 1. A partition A′ is a direct refinement of another partition A, if there are blocks
Ak ∈ A and A′i, A′j ∈ A′ such that Ak = A\A′ and {A′i, A′j} = A′\A.
4A preference attached to no particular agent is denoted with the lower script 0. I adopt this notation from Cho
(2016).
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It’s evident that direct refinement is a complete lattice onA. Figure 1 plots the lattice for the
case where n = 4. Given the direct refinement, we define a path as a sequence (At)Tt=1 ⊂ A
such that A1 = {A}, AT = {{a} : a ∈ A}, and At+1 is a direct refinement of At for every
t = 1, · · · , T −1. LetA′ be a direct refinement ofA, it’s evident that |A′| = |A|+ 1 and hence
T = n for any path. Henceforth we denote a path as (At)
n
t=1. A path plots a sequence from the
coarsest partition to the finest partition by sequentially breaking one block into two. For each
t ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}, let At∗ ≡ At\At+1 be the block inAt that breaks into two smaller blocks.
For each t = 2, · · · , n, let {At1, At2} ≡ At\At−1 be the two blocks whose union is a block in
At−1. Hence fromA1 toA2, A1∗ breaks into A21 and A22; fromA2 toA3, A2∗ breaks into A31
and A32, etc. Two paths are plotted in Figure 1, one with darkened arrows and the other with
darkened and dashed arrows.
Figure 1: Direct refinement relation when A = {a, b, c, d}. A shade covering several objects means a
block containing these objects and each square containing objects and shade(s) is a partition. An arrow
pointing from one partition to another means the latter is a direct refinement of the former.
Given a strict preference P0 ∈ P and a block Ak, we say P0 clusters objects in Ak if
all the objects in Ak are ranked next to each other in P0, i.e., for each x ∈ A\Ak, it’s either
[a P0 x for all a ∈ Ak] or [x P0 a for all a ∈ Ak]. We say a preference P0 ∈ P observes a
partition A if, for each Ak ∈ A, P0 clusters objects in Ak. Given a partition A, the collection
of all preferences that observe this partition is called the domain that observes A and denoted
DA, i.e., DA ≡ {P0 ∈ P|P0 observesA}. Finally given a path (At)nt=1, we say a preference
observes the path if it observes every partition along the path. A sequentially dichotomous
domain is hence defined as the collection of preferences that observe a common path.
Definition 2. A preference domain D ⊂ P is a sequentially dichotomous domain if there is
a path (At)
n
t=1 such that P0 ∈ D if and only if P0 observesAt for all t = 1, · · · , n, i.e.,
5
D =
⋂n
t=1DAt .
Notice that the definition above imposes a richness condition such that every preference
observing the partitions along the path is included. This facilitates out analysis as we focuses
on verifying the sd-strategy-proofness and the fact that a rule is sd-strategy-proof on a domain
is sd-strategy-proof on every sub-domain. Here are two examples of sequentially dichotomous
domains.
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c, d} and consider the path plotted in Figure 1 with darkened ar-
rows, i.e., (At)
4
t=1 where A1 = {{a, b, c, d}}, A2 = {{a, c, d}, {b}}, A3 = {{a, c}, {d}, {b}},
andA4 = {{a}, {c}, {d}, {b}}. Let D be the corresponding sequentially dichotomous domain.
It’s evident that the collection of preferences observing A1 is exactly the universal domain,
i.e., DA1 = P. However, not every preference observing A1 is included in D since it needs to
observe in addition A2. To observe A2 is equivalent to that b is ranked either at the top or at
the bottom. However not every preference in which b is ranked at the top (or at the bottom)
is admissible since it’s required to observe in addition A3. For a preference in
⋂2
t=1DAt to
observe A3, it suffices to make sure that a and c are ranked next to each other. Last, it’s
evident every preference in P observes A4 trivially. Hence the domain D ≡ {P1, · · · , P8} is a
sequentially dichotomous domain.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
a c d d b b b b
c a a c a c d d
d d c a c a a c
b b b b d d c a
Similarly, let’s consider the path plotted in Figure 1 with darkened and hashed arrows,
i.e., (A′t)
4
t=1 where A
′
1 = {{a, b, c, d}}, A′2 = {{a, c}, {b, d}}, A′3 = {{a}, {c}, {b, d}}, and
A′4 = {{a}, {c}, {b}, {d}}.
From similar procedure above, we can find the sequentially dichotomous domain with re-
spect to (A′t)
4
t=1 as such that includes preferences P
′
1 to P
′
8 below.
P ′1 P
′
2 P
′
3 P
′
4 P
′
5 P
′
6 P
′
7 P
′
8
a c a c b b d d
c a c a d d b b
b b d d a c a c
d d b b c a c a
In the next section we show that the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially dichoto-
mous domain. Verification of this essentially requires one to examine the change in assignments
when an agent unilaterally deviates. The structure of a sequentially dichotomous domain facili-
tates such examinations as an admissible deviation can be decomposed as a sequence of flipping
two adjacently ranked blocks, which we call one-shot deviations; formally,
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Definition 3. A preference P˜0 is a one-shot deviation of P0 if there are two nonempty and
disjoint subsets A1, A2 ⊂ A such that
1. a P˜0 b if and only if b P0 a, for all a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2,
2. a P˜0 b if and only if a P0 b, for all a, b ∈ A other than a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2,
3. 6 ∃ a ∈ A1 b ∈ A2 c ∈ A\{A1, A2} such that a P0 c P0 b or b P0 c P0 a.
One-shot deviation can be seen as a generalization of ”local flip” by Sato (2013), which
refers to a flip between two adjacently raked objects without any other change. In stead of two
adjacently ranked objects, one-shot deviation can be between two adjacently ranked blocks.
The third requirement in its definition says that two flipped blocks need to be adjacently ranked.
However, on a sequentially dichotomous domain, this requirement is vacuous since whenever
two blocks can be flipped they are adjacently ranked. We nevertheless impose the third condi-
tion, mainly for better understanding of why the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially
dichotomous domain.
The following example illustrates a decomposition of a deviation as a sequence of one-shot
deviations.
Example 2. Consider the sequentially dichotomous domainD ≡ {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P5, P6, P8},
illustrated in Example 1. Let a deviation be from P1 to P8. Such a deviation can be decomposed
as the sequence of one-shot deviations below.
P1 : a  c  d  b
↓
P5 : b  a  c  d
↓
P7 : b  d  a  c
↓
P8 : b  d  c  a
Recall that the sequentially dichotomous domain is defined according to the path (At)
4
t=1
where A1 = {{a, b, c, d}}, A2 = {{a, c, d}, {b}}, A3 = {{a, c}, {d}, {b}}, and A4 =
{{a}, {c}, {d}, {b}}. First, P5 is an one-shot deviation of P1 with respect to {b} and {a, c, d}
which are two blocks in A2 broken from {a, b, c, d} in A1. Second, P7 is an one-shot deviation
of P5 with respect to {a, c} and {d} which are two blocks in A3 broken from {a, c, d} in A2.
Finally, P8 is an one-shot deviation of P7 with respect to {a} and {c} which are two blocks in
A4 broken from {a, c} inA3.
This section ends with several remarks on the sequentially dichotomous domains.
Remark 1. A sequentially dichotomous domain D satisfies minimal richness, i.e., for each
a ∈ A, there is a preference P0 ∈ D such that r1(P0) = a. This is already illustrated by the
domains in Example 1.
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Remark 2. Given n be the number of objects, a sequentially dichotomous domain has 2n−1
preferences, exactly the same size as the single-peaked domain. As in Example 1, when n = 4,
a sequentially dichotomous domain includes 8 preferences.
Remark 3. Two different paths may lead to the same sequentially dichotomous domain. Con-
sider the domain containing P ′1 to P
′
8 in the above example. This domain can also be seen as
respect to the path (A′′t )
4
t=1, whereA
′′
3 ≡ {{a, c}, {b}, {d}} andA′′t ≡ A′t for t = 1, 2, 4.
However such nonuniqueness is not a problem for our analysis since we always start from
a given domain and as long as this domain can be structured as a sequentially dichotomous
domain according to some path, our analysis goes smoothly.
Remark 4. Liu and Zeng (2016) introduce the restricted tier domains. Let P ≡ (Ak)Kk=1 be an
ordered partition on the object set that each block Ak contains at most two objects. A restricted
tier domain is then defined as a collection of preferences that observe the order of the blocks,
i.e., agents are allowed only to flip the objects contained by the same block.
A sequentially dichotomous domain can be expressed as a union of several restricted tier
domains. And given a sequentially dichotomous domain and a path with respect to which the
domain is defined, the involving ordered partitions can be recovered. For example, the domain
in Example 1 defined with respect to (At)
4
t=1 is the union of four restricted tier domains with
the ordered partitions being, respectively,
P1 : A11 = {a, c}, A12 = {d}, A13 = {b}
P2 : A21 = {d}, A22 = {a, c}, A23 = {b}
P3 : A31 = {b}, A32 = {a, c}, A33 = {d}
P4 : A41 = {b}, A42 = {d}, A43 = {a, c}
In addition, the domain in Example 1 defined with respect to (A′t)
4
t=1 is the union of two
restricted tier domains with the ordered partitions being, respectively, P1 : A11 = {a, c}, A12 =
{b, d} and P2 : A21 = {b, d}, A22 = {a, c}.
Remark 5. A sequentially dichotomous domain can be understood as a lexicographical prefer-
ence domain. Imagine that the object set is a Cartesian product of n − 1 characteristics, each
of which takes two values. For each t = 1, · · · , n−1, an agent looks at the collection of objects
with the same values in all top-(t− 1) characteristics. She expresses a choice between the two
values of the t−th characteristic, then every object with the chosen value is supposed to be bet-
ter than every object with the unchosen value, within the focused object subset. By expressing
a sequence of binary choices, an agent figures out a fully specified preference on the object set.
Remark 6. A sequentially dichotomous domain is a Condorcet domain (Monjardet (2009)),
on which the majority rule applies without a circle. This is an very interesting feature of this
domain. In the current paper, we focus on the sd-strategy-proofness of the PS rule. This in-
teresting feature of sequentially dichotomous domains guarantees sd-strategy-proofness of also
some random voting rules, for example the maximal lotteries (Fishburn (1984) and Brandl et al.
(2016)).
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4 sd-Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Serial Rule
This section shows that the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially dichotomous do-
main. Recall that a deviation on a sequentially dichotomous domain can be decomposed as a
sequence of one-shot deviations, we show sd-strategy-proofness of the PS rule on a sequen-
tially dichotomous domain in two steps, each of which presented in one subsection. First,
we define an incentive compatibility notion weaker than sd-strategy-proofness: one-shot sd-
strategy-proofness which says that reporting the true preference leads to a lottery that stochasti-
cally dominates the lottery delivered by any one-shot deviation. We show that, on a sequentially
dichotomous domain, a rule is sd-strategy-proof if and only if it is one-shot sd-strategy-proof.
Next we present the theorem by showing that the PS rule on a sequentially dichotomous domain
satisfies one-shot sd-strategy-proofness.
4.1 Step 1: One-Shot sd-Strategy-Proofness
This subsection shows that, on a sequentially dichotomous domain, a rule is sd-strategy-
proof if and only if it satisfies a weaker incentive compatibility notion. This incentive compat-
ibility requires that reporting the true preference leads to a lottery stochastically dominates the
lottery delivered by any one-shot deviation. Formally
Definition 4. A rule ϕ : Dn → L is one-shot sd-strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I , Pi, P˜i ∈ D, and
P−i ∈ Dn−1, such that P˜i is an one-shot deviation of Pi, ϕi(Pi, P−i) P sdi ϕi(P˜i, P−i).
It is evident that one-shot sd-strategy-proofness is a weaker requirement than sd-strategy-
proofness. One-shot sd-strategy-proofness is in general insufficient to imply sd-strategy-proofness.
However, on a sequentially dichotomous domain, if an one-shot sd-strategy-proof rule is guar-
anteed to be sd-strategy-proof, as illustrated in the example below.
Example 3. Consider the decomposition of a deviation as a sequence of one-shot deviations
illustrated in Example 2. We show that one-shot sd-strategy-proofness in addition to one-shot
invariance implies sd-strategy-proofness.
P1 : a  c  d  b
↓ L1 P sd1 L5 + L5 P sd1 L7 + L7 P sd1 L8 ⇒ L1 P sd1 L8
P5 : b  a  c  d ⇑ ⇑
↓ L5 P sd5 L7 L7 P sd5 L8
P7 : b  d  a  c ⇑
↓ L7 P sd7 L8
P8 : b  d  c  a
The lotteries L1, L5, L7, L8 denote the deviating agent’s lottery when she reports respec-
tively P1, P5, P7, P8. To verify sd-strategy-proofness, it suffices to establish L1 P sd1 L8. With
one-shot sd-strategy-proofness, we have respectively L1 P sd1 L5, L5 P
sd
5 L7, and L7 P
sd
7 L8.
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Notice that, one-shot sd-strategy-proofness implies that the probability assigned to b by L5 and
L7 must be the same. Then since the ranking of objects in the other block, i.e., {a, c, d} is the
same in P1 and P5, L5 P sd5 L7 implies L5 P
sd
1 L7. Similarly L7 P
sd
7 L8 implies L7 P
sd
5 L8,
which then implies L7 P sd1 L8. Finally the transitivity of P
sd
1 establishes L1 P
sd
1 L8.
Lemma 1. On a sequentially dichotomous domain, a rule is sd-strategy-proof if and only if it
is one-shot sd-strategy-proof.
The lemma is proved according to the logic illustrated in Example 3. The proof of Lemma 1
is in Appendix A.
4.2 Step 2: Theorem
Due to Lemma 1, to show sd-strategy-proofness of the PS rule on a sequentially dichoto-
mous domain, it suffices to show one-shot sd-strategy-proofness. Actually, what we can show
is slightly stronger as presented by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let P ∈ Pn, P˜1 ∈ P, if there are two nonempty subsets of objects A1, A2 ⊂ A such
that
1. for all i ∈ I , Pi clusters objects in A1, A2, and A1 ∪ A2 respectively;
2. P˜1 is an one-shot deviation of P1 with respect to A1 and A2 such that a P1 b and b P˜1 a
for a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2.
then: (1) PS1,a(P ) > PS1,a(P˜1, P−1) for all a ∈ A1, (2) PS1,b(P ) 6 PS1,b(P˜1, P−1) for all
b ∈ A2, and (3) PS1,x(P ) = PS1,x(P˜1, P−1) for all x ∈ A\A1 ∪ A2.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix B.
Lemma 2 says that if one agent performs an one-shot deviation with respect to two blocks
A1, A2 ⊂ A and it’s known that in every other’s preference these two objects are adjacently
ranked, then for every object that has been moved downward the deviator’s preference, the
probability that the deviator gets this object is non-increasing. It’s evident that this lemma
implies one-shot sd-strategy-proofness on a sequentially dichotomous domain.
The statement of Lemma 2 is stronger than PS rule being one-shot sd-strategy-proof on a
sequentially dichotomous domain from two aspects. The first is that the lemma does not require
the preferences from a sequentially dichotomous domain. Rather, the requirement is that in
every preference objects in A1, A2, and A1 ∪ A2 are respectively clustered. The second is that
one-shot sd-strategy-proofness does not require the probability of every object that is moved
downward the deviator’s preference is non-increasing. Rather, one-shot sd-strategy-proofness
requires only the probability of every upper contour set is non-increasing. For example, con-
sider a one-shot deviation from abcd to cabd, one-shot sd-strategy-proofness requires that the
probability of getting a, b combined is non-increasing. Particularly, it’s allowed that the proba-
bility of getting b is increasing as long as the decrease in a’s probability exceeds the increase in
b’s probability.
We are now ready to present the theorem.
10
Theorem 1. The PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially dichotomous domain.
The theorem follows directly from Lemma 1, and Lemma 2. By Lemma 2, the PS rule on a
sequentially dichotomous domain is one-shot sd-strategy-proof. Then by Lemma 1 the PS rule
is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially dichotomous domain.
5 Maximality
From Theorem 1, a sequentially dichotomous domain guarantees sd-strategy-proofness for
the PS rule. The next interesting question is can we expand a sequentially dichotomous domain
while preserving sd-strategy-proofness for the PS rule? The answer is negative, as indicated
by Theorem 2. The theorem shows that given an arbitrary sequentially dichotomous domain,
whenever an additional preference is admissible, the PS rule becomes manipulable.
Theorem 2. A sequentially dichotomous domain is maximal for the probabilistic serial rule to
be sd-strategy-proof.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C.
In the proof, we fix an arbitrary sequentially dichotomous domain D and an arbitrary pref-
erence out of it P˜0 ∈ P\D. We first compare the fixed preference with the path according to
which the sequentially dichotomous domain is defined. Then according to such comparison,
we identify two preferences within the sequentially dichotomous domain P0, P¯0 ∈ D and then
construct two preference profiles consisting of only P˜0, P0, P¯0. In these two preference profiles,
only one agent unilaterally deviates. Finally we calculate the relevant probabilities specified by
the PS rule and show that this deviation is profitable.
6 Last Comments
In this paper, we introduce a class of preference domains, sequentially dichotomous do-
mains. We first show that the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on a sequentially dichotomous do-
main. Then we show that each of such domains is maximal for the PS rule to be sd-strategy-
proof.
A remaining interesting question is whether the class of sequentially dichotomous domains
is uniquely maximal. In other words, if we know already that the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof
on a given domain, can we structure it as a sub-domain of a sequentially dichotomous domain?
Unfortunately, the next example proves this to be false.
Example 4. Consider a domain D consisting of only two preferences as follows
P0 :a  b  c  d
P¯0 :c  a  d  b
It’s easy to check that the PS rule is sd-strategy-proof on D. However D can never be structured
as a sequentially dichotomous domain. The key insight is that we can not find a dichotomous
partition such that both P0 and P¯0 observe it.
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Interestingly the pattern indicated by D is also a fundamental piece for some computer sci-
ence studies, for example Rossin and Bouvel (2006). In their language, a permutation, i.e., a
linear order like P¯0 given P0 already present, is said to be separable if we can find a path such
that both P0 and P¯0 observe it. It seems that being separable is a convenient and fundamental
structure for a computer either to generate permutations fast or compare two sets of permuta-
tions fast.
For CS studies, it’s perfectly justified that the pattern ofD is excluded artificially due to com-
putational targets. However, there is no economically reasonable excuse, as my understanding,
to exclude such a pattern artificially. Hence, although it might be possible that by excluding
such pattern, we can establish the uniqueness of the sequentially dichotomous domain for the
PS rule to be sd-strategy-proof, this exercise is not of much economic interest.
However, it is still interesting that we find some economically reasonable richness condition,
under which the uniqueness of the sequentially dichotomous domain can be established. This
is left for future studies.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The necessity is evident by definition. We prove the sufficiency part.
Let D be a sequentially dichotomous domain, (At)nt=1 its corresponding path, and ϕ : Dn →
L an one-shot sd-strategy-proof rule. Fix an arbitrary P ∈ Dn and P ′1 ∈ D\{P1}. In addition,
let L ≡ ϕ(P ) and L′ ≡ ϕ(P ′1, P−1). It suffices to show L1 P sd1 L′1.
Along the path down from A1 to An, in each step a block breaks into two smaller ones.
A preference P0 observing the path figures the ranking between the two blocks in each step
t = 2, · · · , n. (For t = 1, there is only one major block.) Recall that for each t = 2, · · · , n,
At1 and At2 denote the two blocks broken from one. Without loss of generality, let a P1 b for
all t = 2, · · · , n, a ∈ At1, b ∈ At2. Consequently P1 6= P ′1 implies a subsequence {tγ}Γγ=1 ⊂
{t}nt=2 such that b P ′1 a for all γ = 1, · · · ,Γ, a ∈ At1, b ∈ At2.
Let P10 ≡ P1, define a sequence of preferences (P1γ)Γγ=1: for each γ, (i) b P1γ a if and only
if a P1γ−1 b for all a ∈ Atγ1 and b ∈ Atγ2; and (ii) a P1γ b if and only if a P1γ−1 b otherwise.
That is, for each γ ∈ {1, · · · ,Γ}, the difference between P1γ and P1γ−1 is only an exchange
between the blocks Atγ1 and Atγ2, without any other change. Hence each P1γ is an one-shot
deviation of P1γ−1. In addition, by this sequence of one-shot deviations, we approach P ′1 grad-
ually, i.e., P1Γ = P ′1. Notice that for each γ ∈ {1, · · · ,Γ}, P1γ ∈ D.
Correspondingly we denote Lγ ≡ PS(P1γ, P−1) for each γ = 1, · · · ,Γ. In the following,
we fix an γ and show Lγ−11 P
sd
1 L
γ
1 , in two steps.
Step 1: We show Lγ−11 P sd1γ−1 L
γ
1 . Notice that P1γ is an one-shot deviation of P1γ−1 then the
premise of one-shot sd-strategy-proofness verifies the step.
Step 2: We show, for all α = 2, · · · , γ, Lγ−11 P sd1α−1 Lγ1 ⇒ Lγ−11 P sd1α−2 Lγ1 .
First notice that, since α 6 γ, both P1α−1 and P1α−2 clusters Atγ1, Atγ2, and Atγ1 ∪ Atγ2.
Notice in addition that P1α−1 and P1α−2 are different only in an exchange of two adjacent blocks,
i.e., Atα−11 and Atα−12. Notice last that, by the definition of the sequentially dichotomous
domain, either one of the following two cases happens.
Case 1:
(
Atγ1 ∪ Atγ2
) ⊂ Atα−11 or (Atγ1 ∪ Atγ2) ⊂ Atα−12. We show Lγ−11 P sd1α−1 Lγ1 ⇒
Lγ−11 P
sd
1α−2 L
γ
1 for the former sub-case and the argument applies to the latter sub-case as well.
Notice that according to the definitions of (P1γ)
Γ
γ=1, a P1α−2 b and a P1α−1 b for all a ∈ Atγ1
and b ∈ Atγ2. We illustrate the situation as follows.
P1α−2 : · · · · · ·  · · ·  Atγ1  Atγ2  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
Atα−11
 Atα−12  · · · · · ·
P1α−1 : · · · · · ·  Atα−12  · · ·  Atγ1  Atγ2  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
Atα−11
 · · · · · ·
Recall that one-shot sd-strategy-proofness implies that Lγ−11 and L
γ
1 are different only in prob-
abilities of objects in Atγ1 and Atγ2 and that the rankings within blocks are the same in both
P1α−2 and P1α−1. Then by definition of the stochastic dominance, we have L
γ−1
1 P
sd
1α−1 L
γ
1 ⇒
Lγ−11 P
sd
1α−2 L
γ
1 .
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Case 2:
(
Atγ1 ∪ Atγ2
) ∩ (Atα−11 ∪ Atα−12) = ∅. We illustrate the situation as follows.
P1α−2 : · · · · · ·  · · ·  Atγ1  Atγ2  · · ·  Atα−11  Atα−12  · · · · · ·
P1α−1 : · · · · · ·  · · ·  Atγ1  Atγ2  · · ·  Atα−12  Atα−11  · · · · · ·
Recall that one-shot sd-strategy-proofness implies that Lγ−11 and L
γ
1 are different only in prob-
abilities of objects in Atγ1 and Atγ2 and that the rankings within blocks are the same in both
P1α−2 and P1α−1. Then by definition of the stochastic dominance, we have L
γ−1
1 P
sd
1α−1 L
γ
1 ⇒
Lγ−11 P
sd
1α−2 L
γ
1 , which verifies the step 2.
Finally, by the transitivity of P sd1 , L1 = L
0
1 P
sd
1 L
Γ
1 = L
′
1.
B Proof of Lemma 2
For illustration purpose, we start from the definition of the PS rule. The PS rule treats the
objects as if they are divisible and specifies random assignment for a given preference profile
as follows. Starting from time 0, all agents consume their most preferred object at the unit
speed until some objects are exhausted. Then agents stop consumption and reformulate their
preferences by removing the objects exhausted. Next, agents resume consuming their most pre-
ferred objects in the available set, until some objects are exhausted. This procedure is repeated
until all objects are exhausted. The ending time of this procedure is 1, since we have n agents
consuming n objects with unit speed. Finally, the share of an object consumed by an agent is
interpreted as the probability of this agent obtaining this object. Formally the PS rule is defined
as follows. We borrow the notations from Kojima and Manea (2010).
Definition 5. Fix a preference profile P ∈ Dn, PS(P ) gives a random assignment [Lia]i∈I,a∈A ∈
L as follows. For any a ∈ A′ ⊂ A, let N(a,A′) = {i ∈ I|a Pi b, ∀b ∈ A′\{a}} represent the
set of agents whose most preferred object in A′ is a. Let A0 = A, t0 = 0, and L0ia = 0 for every
i ∈ I and a ∈ A. For all v > 1, given t0, A0, [L0ia]i∈I,a∈A, · · · , tv−1, Av−1, [Lv−1ia ]i∈I,a∈A, define
tv = min
a∈Av−1
max
{
t ∈ [0, 1]|
∑
i∈I
Lv−1ia + |N(a,Av−1)|(t− tv−1) 6 1
}
Av = Av−1
∖{
a ∈ Av−1|
∑
i∈I
Lv−1ia + |N(a,Av−1)|(tv − tv−1) = 1
}
Lvia =
{
Lv−1ia + t
v − tv−1 if i ∈ N(a,Av−1)
Lv−1ia otherwise.
(1)
Since A is a finite set, there exists v¯ such that Av¯ = ∅. We define PS(P ) = Lv¯.
Fix a preference profile P , we call the sequence generated by applying the PS rule to P ,
(tv, Av, Lv)v¯v=0, the corresponding consumption procedure. Evidently, for each v ∈ {0, · · · , v¯},
Av is the collection of objects which are still available at time tv. In other words, if a ∈
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Av−1\Av, a is available at tv−1 and exhausted at tv, i.e., tv is exactly the time when a is ex-
hausted. For each a ∈ A, let ta ≡ tv where a ∈ Av−1\Av denote the time when a is exhausted.
This subsection shows that the PS rule satisfies the one-shot invariance on a sequentially
dichotomous domain. Recall that a sequentially dichotomous domain is an intersection of
domains, each of which observes a partition. Then for better understanding of the consump-
tion procedure specified by the PS rule when the preferences are from a sequentially dichoto-
mous domain, we investigate the consumption procedure subject to a given partition, denoted
as
(
tv
∣∣
A
, Av
∣∣
A
, Lv
∣∣
A
)
.
Given a preference profile P ∈ DnA, every agent’s preference clusters every block in A.
Let {a, b} ∈ A be a block, then for every agent it’s either that a is ranked just above b or
that b is ranked just above a. Hence if a is exhausted before b, then agents who prefers a to
b start to consume b immediately when a is exhausted and all the others keep consuming b
until it’s exhausted. If instead b is exhausted before a, then agents who prefers b to a start
to consume a immediately when b is exhausted and all the others keep consuming a until it’s
exhausted. So, if we focus on only blocks rather than objects, we can simply ignore the time
when a is exhausted when it’s exhausted before b and ignore the time when b is exhausted when
it’s exhausted before a. In other words, what we care about is only the time when the whole
block is exhausted. Formally the consumption procedure subject to A,
(
tv
∣∣
A
, Av
∣∣
A
, Lv
∣∣
A
)
,
is defined as follows.
Let V
∣∣
A
≡ {v ∈ {0, · · · , v¯}|∃Ak ∈ A s.t. tv = maxa∈Ak ta} be the collection of time
points when a block is exhausted.
• tv∣∣
A
is the subsequence of (tv)v¯v=0 involving elements in V
∣∣
A
. We record only the time
points when a block inA is exhausted.
• Av∣∣
A
is the subsequence of (Av)v¯v=0 involving elements in V
∣∣
A
.
• Lv∣∣
A
is a matrix [LviAk ]i∈I,Ak∈A defined only for elements in V
∣∣
A
, whereLviAk ≡
∑
a∈Ak L
v
ia.
When we focus on the consumption procedure subject to a partition, an important obser-
vation is that the consumption procedure subject to A should not change when the preference
profile is changing in a way that the ”ranking” of the blocks remain the same. That is, the change
involves only permutations within blocks won’t change the consumption procedure subject to
the partition. Here is an example.
Example 5. Let P ≡ (P1, P2, P5, P6) and P¯ ≡ (P3, P2, P5, P6) where the preferences are from
Example 1. The eating procedures of two profiles are illustrated as follows.
1:
2:
3:
4:
0 1/2 3/4 1
a a d
c c d
b a d
b c d
1:
2:
3:
4:
0 1/2 3/4 1
d d d
c c a
b a a
b c a
16
It’s evident that all involved preferences observeA2 = {{a, c, d}, {b}}. In addition the con-
sumption procedure subject to A2 = {{a, c, d}, {b}} is not changing: In time interval (0, 1/2]
agents 1 and 2 consume objects in block {a, c, d} and agents 3 and 4 consume {b}. Then in time
interval (1/2, 1] all agent consume objects in {a, c, d}.
We formalize the observation illustrated in Example 5. Given a partition A, a preference
observing it, P0 ∈ DA, induces a (strict) preference on A in a natural way: a block is said
to be ranked above another block if every object in the former is ranked above every object in
the latter. Given a partition A, P(A) denotes the collection of all strict preferences, i.e., linear
orders, onA.
Definition 6. For fixed partition A, a preference on the blocks PA0 ∈ P(A) is induced by a
preference on objects P0 ∈ DA if, for each pair of blocks Ak, Al ∈ A, Ak PA0 Al if and only if
a P0 b for all a ∈ Ak and b ∈ Al.
It’s easy to see that a preference P0 ∈ DA induces a unique preference PA0 on A. However
the converse is not true: two different preferences P0, P ′0 ∈ DA may induce the same preference
PA0 on A. For example, preferences P1 and P3 in Example 1 induce the same preference on
A2: {a, c, d}  {b}.
Now we formalize the observation in Example 5 as the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For P, P¯ ∈ DnA such that PAi = P¯Ai for all i ∈ I , the consumption proce-
dures subject to A for two preference profiles are the same, which implies
∑
a∈Ak PSia(P ) =∑
a∈Ak PSia(P¯ ) for all i ∈ I and Ak ∈ A.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 2.
LetL ≡ PS(P ) and L˜ ≡ PS(P˜1, P−1). Let (tv, Av, [Lvia]i∈I,a∈A)v¯v=0 and
(
t˜v, A˜v, [L˜via]i∈I,a∈A
)¯˜v
v=0
be respectively consumption procedures for P and (P˜1, P−1). In addition, let B ≡ {a ∈
A|aP1x,∀x ∈ A1 ∪ A2} and C ≡ A\ (A ∪ A1 ∪ A2) be respectively the upper and lower
contour sets of objects in A1 ∪ A2 according to P1. Evidently, these two sets are the same for
P˜1.
Before proceeding to the proof, we clarify some notations.
• For each a ∈ A, let ta ≡ tv s.t. a ∈ Av−1\Av, i.e., ta is the time when a is exhausted in the
procedure of applying the PS rule to P . For each a ∈ A, let t˜a ≡ t˜v s.t. a ∈ A˜v−1\A˜v, i.e.,
t˜a is the time when a is exhausted in the procedure of applying the PS rule to (P˜1, P−1).
Similarly, for each A¯ ⊂ A, let tA¯ ≡ max{ta : a ∈ A¯}, i.e., tA¯ is the time when all the
objects in A¯ are exhausted in the procedure of applying the PS rule to P . For each A¯ ⊂ A,
let t˜A¯ ≡ max{t˜a : a ∈ A¯}, i.e., t˜A¯ is the time when all the objects in A¯ are exhausted in
the procedure of applying the PS rule to (P˜1, P−1).
• For each a ∈ A and v ∈ {0, 1, · · · , v¯}, let Sa(tv) ≡ 1 −
∑
i∈I L
v
ia, i.e., Sa(t
v) is the
remaining share of a at time tv in the procedure of applying the PS rule to P . For each
a ∈ A and v ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ¯˜v}, let S˜a(t˜v) ≡ 1 −
∑
i∈I L˜
v
ia, i.e., S˜a(t˜
v) is the remaining
share of a at time t˜v in the procedure of applying the PS rule to (P˜1, P−1).
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• For each a ∈ A and each i ∈ I , let ti(a) ≡ max{tx : xPia} be the time when all the
objects in the upper contour set of a in Pi are exhausted when the PS rule is applied to P .
Hence ti(a) is also the time when agent i starts to consume a whenever there is still some
of a available, i.e., Sa(ti(a)) > 0. In addition, for a block A¯, let ti(A¯) = min{ti(a) : a ∈
A¯} be the time when the upper contour set of A¯ is exhausted before deviation. Similarly,
for each a ∈ A and each i ∈ I , let t˜i(a) ≡ max{t˜x : xP˜ia} be the time when all the
objects in the upper contour set of a in P˜i are exhausted when the PS rule is applied to
(P˜1, P−1). In addition, for a block A¯, let t˜i(A¯) = min{t˜i(a) : a ∈ A¯} be the time when
the upper contour set of A¯ is exhausted after deviation.
We prove the lemma in three steps.
Step 1: L1a = L˜1a for all a ∈ B ∪ C.
Consider a partition A ≡ {A1 ∪ A2, {a} : a ∈ A\ (A1 ∪ A2)}. Then it’s evident that the
induced profiles of preferences onA of P and (P˜1, P−1) are the same. Hence by Lemma 3, we
have what we want. In addition, by Lemma 3, we have the following claims which are used
subsequently.
Claim 1. For each i ∈ I , ti(A1∪A2) = t˜i(A1∪A2), i.e., each agent starts to consume A1∪A2,
if any, at the same time before and after agent 1’s deviation.
Claim 2. tA1∪A2 = t˜A1∪A2 , i.e., each agent stops consuming A1 ∪ A2, if any, at the same time
before and after the deviation.
Claim 3. tB = t˜B, i.e., B is exhausted at the same time before and after the deviation. In
addition, Sa(tB) = S˜a(tB) for each a ∈ A1 ∪ A2, that is when B is exhausted the remaining
share of each object in A1 ∪ A2 is not changing because of agent 1’s deviation.
Step 2: L1a > L˜1a for all a ∈ A1.
If
∑
a∈A1 Sa(tB) = 0, i.e., when B is exhausted and agent 1 is about to consume objects in
A1, A1 is already exhausted, then by Claim 3 L1a = L˜1a = 0 for all a ∈ A1 and hence the result
holds trivially.
If
∑
a∈A2 Sa(tB) = 0, i.e., when B is exhausted the objects in A2 is already exhausted, then
it’s evident that the consumption procedures of applying the PS rule to P and (P˜1, P−1) are the
same. Which then implies L1a = L˜1a for all a ∈ A1 and hence the result holds trivially.
In addition, if
∑
a∈A1 L˜1a = 0, the result holds trivially.
Hence we show Step 2 when
∑
a∈A1 Sa(tB) > 0,
∑
a∈A2 Sa(tB) > 0, and
∑
a∈A1 L˜1a > 0.
Notice that before deviation tB is the time when agent 1 starts to consume A1. After de-
viation, when B is exhausted, agent 1 starts to consume A2 and will turn to A1 when A2 is
exhausted. Hence t˜B∪A2 > t˜B = tB is the time when agent 1 starts to consume A1 after
deviation. That is agent 1 starts to consume A1 latter after the deviation.
Then to show Step 2, it suffices to show the following two statements.
1. Sa(tB) > S˜a(t˜B∪A2) for each a ∈ A1, i.e., when agent 1 is about to consume objects in
A1, she finds that the remaining share of each object in A1 is less;
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2. For each i ∈ I\{1} with ∑a∈A1 Lia > 0, agent i starts consuming A1 after agent 1’s de-
viation at a time no latter than the time when she started to consume A1 before deviation,
i.e., all the agents who compete with agent 1 in consuming A1 will still do so after the
deviation.
Recall that t˜B∪A2 > tB, then to show statement 1, it suffices to show for each agent i ∈
I\{1} who started to consume A1 before agent 1’s deviation at a time before tB will start
consuming A1 after agent 1’s deviation at a time no latter than that time. Notice that this new
statement is implied by the statement 2. Hence what we need to show is just statement 2.
To show this, recall first Claim 1 and 2 which say that each agent starts to consumeA1∪A2 at
the same time before and after agent 1’s deviation. Then pick any i ∈ I\{1} with∑a∈A1 Lia >
0, if a Pi b for all a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2, we know that she starts to consume A1 at the same time
before and after agent 1’s deviation. Suppose instead, b Pi a for all a ∈ A1 and b ∈ A2, since
we know this agent starts to consume A1 immediately when all the objects in A2 are exhausted,
what we need is just tB∪A2 > t˜B∪A2 . This can be seen from the consumption procedures for P
and (P˜1, P−1) subject to the partition {A1, A2, {a ∈ A : a 6∈ A1 ∪A2}}. Hence we have shown
that for each i ∈ I\{1} with ∑a∈A1 Lia > 0, if she prefers A1 to A2, she starts to consume A1
at the same time before and after the deviation; if she prefers A2 to A1, she starts to consume
A1 after the deviation at a time earlier than before deviation, which proves Step 2.
Step 3: L1a 6 L˜1a for all a ∈ A2.
By exchanging the roles of P1 and P˜1, Step 3 is implied by Step 2.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Let D be a sequentially dichotomous domain and (At)nt=1 the corresponding path. Let P˜0 be
an arbitrary preference out of D, we show that the PS rule defined on the combination of D and
P˜0, i.e., PS :
(
D ∪ {P˜0}
)n
→ L, is manipulable.
Let t ≡ min{t ∈ {1, · · · , n} : P˜0 does not observeAt}. Since P˜0 ∈ P\D, t is well-defined.
In addition, since P˜0 observes A1 trivially, t > 2 and P˜0 observes At−1. Recall that from
At−1 to At, A(t−1)∗ breaks into At1 and At2. Let a ≡ r1(P˜0, A(t−1)∗) be the most preferred
objects according to P˜0 in A(t−1)∗. Without loss of generality, let a ∈ At1. In addition, let
c ≡ r1(P˜0, At2) be the most preferred objects according to P˜0 in At2. Since P˜0 does not observe
At, there must be b ∈ At1\{a} ranked below c. Let b ≡ r1(P˜0, {x ∈ At1 : c P˜0 x}) be the most
preferred object in At1 that is ranked below c. In addition, let C ≡ {x ∈ At1\{a} : x P˜0 c}.
Notice that C may be empty. Hence P˜0 can be illustrated as follows.
P˜0 : · · · · · · 
A(t−1)∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  · · ·C · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 c  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At2
 b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 · · · · · ·  · · · · · ·
There must be an unique t > t such that a, b ∈ A(t−1)∗, a ∈ At1, and b ∈ At2, i.e., from
At−1 to At, a and b are split into two separate blocks. Respectively, let B ≡ At1\{a} and
D ≡ At2\{b}. In the following, we identify two preferences P0, P¯0 ∈ D. Then we construct
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two preference profiles consisting of only P˜0, P0 and P¯0 and show that there is a profitable
manipulation. To do this, we need to consider four cases.
Case 1: C = ∅ or r1(P˜0, C) 6∈ B ∪D.
Since P˜0 observes At−1, P˜
At−1
0 is well-defined. Let P
At−1
0 = P¯
At−1
0 = P˜
At−1
0 . Second, let
A(t−1)∗ be the first ranked block inAt−1 according to both P0 and P¯0. Third, let At1P
At
0 At2 and
At2P¯
At
0 At1. Fourth, let respectively a the first ranked object in At1 and b the first ranked object
in At2 according to both P0 and P¯0. Last, let P0 and P¯0 have the same ranking of the objects
contained in the same block. It’s evident that P0, P¯0 ∈ D. Hence, P0 and P¯0 are illustrated
below.
P0 : · · · · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  · · ·B · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · ·  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P¯0 : · · · · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  · · ·B · · ·  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
Let P ≡ (P˜1, P2, P3, · · · , Pn) and P ′ ≡ (P˜1, P¯2, P3, · · · , Pn). We calculate the probabilities
specified by the PS rule as follows.
PS(P ) : a B b D
1 : 1
n
0 0 0
2 · · ·n : 1
n
|B|
n−1
1
n−1
|D|
n−1
For P , all agents equally share a. After that agents 2 to n consume B ∪ {b} ∪ D while
agent 1 consumes c if C is empty and r1(P˜0, C) if not. By sd-efficiency, PS(P )1x = 0 for all
x ∈ B ∪ {b} ∪D. Then equal-treatment-of-equals implies the other entries.
PS(P ′) : a B b D
1 : 1
n−1 0 0 0
2 : 0 0 1
n−1 +
|B|
n−2 +
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−2
n−1
|D|
n−1
3 · · ·n : 1
n−1
|B|
n−2
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−2
n−1
|D|
n−1
For P ′, agents other than 2 equally share a. By sd-efficiency, PS(P )1x = 0 for all x ∈
B ∪ {b} ∪ D. During the period when agents other than 2 consume a, agent 2 consumes b.
When a is exhausted, agents 3 to n start to consume B if B is nonempty and b is b is empty;
agent 1 starts to consume c if C is empty and r1(P˜0, C) if not; and agent 2 still consume b. It’s
evident that B will be exhausted before b or r1(P˜0, C). After that agents 3 to n join agent 2 in
consuming b, so they equally share the remaining share of b, i.e., 1− 1
n−1 − |B|n−2 . Last, agents 2
to n equally share D.
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Now we have a contradiction against sd-strategy-proofness:
sd-strategy-proofness⇒
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P ) =
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P
′)
⇒ 1
n
+
|B|
n− 1 +
1
n− 1 +
|D|
n− 1 =
1
n− 1 +
|B|
n− 2 +
1− 1n−1 − |B|n−2
n− 1 +
|D|
n− 1
⇒ n = 2 : contradiction.
Case 2: r1(P˜0, C) ∈ B.
In order to calculate the random assignments specified by the PS rule, we need to consider
two sub-cases. Given r1(P˜0, C) ∈ B, there is an upper contour set in C contained in B. Let
B1 be the largest such upper contour set, i.e., B1 ≡ maxk6|C|{Uk(P˜0, C) ⊂ B}5. Hence either
B1 = C or r1(P˜0, C\B1) 6∈ B. We consider the sub-cases: (i) B1 = C or r1(P˜0, C\B1) 6∈ D,
or (ii) r1(P˜0, C\B1) ∈ D.
Sub-case 2.1: B1 = C or r1(P˜0, C\B1) 6∈ D.
For this sub-case, we use the same preferences P˜0, P0, and P¯0 as in Case 1 and the same
profiles P ≡ (P˜1, P2, P3, · · · , Pn) and P ′ ≡ (P˜1, P¯2, P3, · · · , Pn).
Given B1, there must be a largest lower contour set in B according to P0 such that does not
contain any object in B1, i.e., let B¯1 ≡ mink6|B|{Uk(P0, B) : (B\Uk(P0, B)) ∩ B1 = ∅}. For
reader to understand the consumption procedure better, preferences are illustrated below with
B1 and B¯1 explicitly located.
P˜0 : · · · · · · 
A(t−1)∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B1  C\B1︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 c  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At2
 b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 · · · · · ·  · · · · · ·
P0 : · · · · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B¯1  B\B¯1 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · ·  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P¯0 : · · · · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B¯1  B\B¯1  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
We calculate the probabilities specified by the PS rule as follows.
PS(P ) : a B b D
1 : 1
n
|B¯1|
n
0 0
2 · · ·n : 1
n
|B¯1|
n
+ |B\B¯1|
n−1
1
n−1
|D|
n−1
For P , all agents equally share a. By construction, after a is exhausted agent 1 consumesB1
and all the others consume B¯1. Notice that the time when agent 1 stops consumingB1 is exactly
the time when the other agents stop consuming B¯1. Hence all the agents start consuming B¯1 at
5Uk(P˜0, C) denotes the collection of the most preferred k objects in C according to P˜0, i.e., Uk(P˜0, C) ≡
{r1(P˜0, C), · · · , rk(P˜0, C)}
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the same time and stop consuming B¯1 also at the same time. Then each agent consumes exactly
|B¯1|
n
share of B¯1. After that agent 1 consumes c if B1 = C and C\B1 if not while all the others
consume B\B¯1 and then b and D. Notice that sd-efficiency implies that agent 1 consumes no
share of b or D.
PS(P ′) : a B b D
1 : 1
n−1
|B¯1|
n−1 0 0
2 : 0 0 1
n−1 +
|B¯1|
n−1 +
|B\B¯1|
n−2 +
1− 1
n−1−
|B¯1|
n−1−
|B\B¯1|
n−2
n−1
|D|
n−1
3 · · ·n : 1
n−1
|B¯1|
n−1 +
|B\B¯1|
n−2
1− 1
n−1−
|B¯1|
n−1−
|B\B¯1|
n−2
n−1
|D|
n−1
For P ′, all agents other than 2 equally share a and during they do this agent 2 consumes b.
After that agents other than 2 equally share B¯1 and agent 2 still consumes b. Then agent 1 starts
to consume c if C = B1 and C\B1 if not and agents 3 to n equally share B\B¯1. During this
time period agent 2 is still consuming b. After that, all agents other than 1 equally share the
remaining share of b, and D after b is exhausted. The zero entries in the above table are implied
by sd-efficiency.
Now we have a contradiction against sd-strategy-proofness:
sd-strategy-proofness⇒
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P ) =
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P
′)
⇒ 1
n
+
|B¯1|
n
+
|B\B¯1|
n− 1 +
1
n− 1 +
|D|
n− 1
=
1
n− 1 +
|B¯1|
n− 1 +
|B\B¯1|
n− 2 +
1− 1n−1 − |B¯1|n−1 − |B\B¯1|n−2
n− 1 +
|D|
n− 1
⇒n = 2 : contradiction.
Sub-case 2.2: r1(P˜0, C\B1) ∈ D.
Given r1(P˜0, C\B1) ∈ D, let D1 be the largest upper contour set in C\B1 contained in
D, i.e., D1 ≡ maxk6|C\B1|{Uk(P˜0, C\B1) ⊂ D}. Similarly, let D¯1 ≡ mink6|D|{Uk(P0, D) :
(D\Uk(P0, D)) ∩ D1 = ∅}. For this sub-case, we use the same preferences and profiles as in
the previous sub-case except a small change in P0: D is ranked above b.
For reader to understand the consumption procedure better, preferences are illustrated below
with B1, B¯1, D1 and D¯1 explicitly located.
P˜0 : · · · · · · 
A(t−1)∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B1  D1  C\(B1 ∪D1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 c  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At2
 b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 · · · · · ·  · · · · · ·
P0 : · · · · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B¯1  B\B¯1 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
D¯1  D\D¯1  b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P¯0 : · · · · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  B¯1  B\B¯1  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
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We calculate the probabilities specified by the PS rule as follows.
PS(P ) : a B b D
1 : 1
n
|B¯1|
n
0 |B\B¯1|
n−1 +
|D¯1|− |B\B¯1|n−1
n
2 · · ·n : 1
n
|B¯1|
n
+ |B\B¯1|
n−1
1
n−1
|D¯1|− |B\B¯1|n−1
n
+ |D\D¯1|
n−1
For P , all agents equally share a and B¯1. After that, agent 1 consumes D1 and all the others
consumes B\B¯1. It’s evident that B\B¯1 is exhausted faster and after this agents 2 to n join
agent 1 in consuming D¯1. When D¯1 is exhausted, agent 1 starts consume c if C\(B1 ∪D1) = ∅
and C\(B1 ∪D1) is otherwise. Agents 2 to n equally share D\D¯1.
PS(P ′) :
a B b D
1 : 1n−1
|B¯1|
n−1 0
|B\B¯1|
n−2 +
|D¯1|− |B\B¯1|n−2
n−1
2 : 0 0 α+ 1−αn−1 0
3 · · ·n : 1n−1 |B¯1|n−1 + |B\B¯1|n−2 1−αn−1
|D¯1|− |B\B¯1|n−2
n−1 +
|D\D¯1|
n−2
where α = 1n−1 +
|B¯1|
n−1 +
|B\B¯1|
n−2 +
|D¯1|− |B\B¯1|n−2
n−1 +
|D\D¯1|
n−2 .
For P ′, agents other than 2 equally share a. When they consume a, agent 2 consumes b.
After a is exhausted, agents other than 2 equally share B¯1 and agent 2 still consumes b. After
B¯1 is exhausted, agent 1 consumes D1, agents 3 to n equally share B\B¯1, and agent 2 still
consumes b. It’s evident that B\B¯1 is exhausted faster. After that agents other than 2 equally
share the remaining share of D¯1 and agent 2 still consumes b. Then agent 1 consumes c if
C\(B1 ∪D1) = ∅ and C\(B1 ∪D1) if otherwise, agents 3 to n equally share D\D¯1, and agent
2 still consumes b. After that agents other than 1 consume the remaining share of b.
Now we have a contradiction against sd-strategy-proofness:
sd-strategy-proofness⇒
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P ) =
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P
′)
⇒ 1
n
+
|B¯1|
n
+
|B\B¯1|
n− 1 +
1
n− 1 +
|D¯1| − |B\B¯1|n−1
n
+
|D\D¯1|
n− 1
= α+
1− α
n− 1
⇒n > |B|+ |D| = 3(n− 1)
n− 2 |D\D¯1|+ n(n− 2) > n : contradiction.
Case 3: r1(P˜0, C) ∈ D and B 6= ∅.
Given r1(P˜0, C) ∈ D, letD1 be the largest upper contour set in C contained inD, i.e.,D1 ≡
maxk6|C|{Uk(P˜0, C) ⊂ D}. Similarly, let D¯1 ≡ mink6|D|{Uk(P0, D) : (D\Uk(P0, D))∩D1 =
∅}. For this sub-case, we use the same preferences and profiles as in Case 1.
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For reader to understand the consumption procedure better, preferences are illustrated below
with D1 and D¯1 explicitly located.
P˜0 : · · · · · · 
A(t−1)∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  D1  C\D1︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 c  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At2
 b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 · · · · · ·  · · · · · ·
P0 : · · · · · · 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  · · ·B · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  D¯1  D\D¯1  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P¯0 : · · · · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  D¯1  D\D¯1 
=At1︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  · · ·B · · ·  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P = (P˜0, P2, P3, · · · , Pn) and P ′ = (P˜1, P¯2, P3, · · · , Pn)
PS(P ) : a B b D
1 : 1
n
0 0 |B|
n−1 +
1
n−1 +
|D¯1|− |B|n−1− 1n−1
n
2 · · ·n : 1
n
|B|
n−1
1
n−1
|D¯1|− |B|n−1− 1n−1
n
+ |D\D¯1|
n−1
For P , all agents equally share a. Then agent 1 consumesD1 and all the others equally share
B and b. It’s evident that B ∪ {b} is exhausted faster. After that all agents share the remaining
of D¯1. Then agent 1 consumes c if C\D1 = ∅ and C\D1 if otherwise and all the other agents
share D\D¯1.
PS(P ′) :
a B b D
1 : 1n−1 0 0
|B|
n−1 +
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1 +
|D¯1|− |B|n−1−
1− 1n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
n
2 : 0 0 1n−1 +
|B|
n−1 +
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
|D¯1|− |B|n−1−
1− 1n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
n +
|D\D¯1|
n−1
3 · · ·n : 1n−1 |B|n−1
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
|D¯1|− |B|n−1−
1− 1n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
n +
|D\D¯1|
n−1
For P ′, all agents except 2 equally share a and during they do this agent 2 consumes b.
After a is exhausted, agent 1 consumes D1, agent 2 still consumes b, and all the others consume
B. It’s evident that B is exhausted faster. Then agents 3 to n join agent 2 in consuming the
remaining share of b and agent 1 still consumes D1. After b is exhausted, all agents equally
share the remaining share of D¯1. Then agent 1 consumes c if C\D1 = ∅ and C\D1 if otherwise
and all the other agents share D\D¯1.
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Now we have a contradiction against sd-strategy-proofness:
sd-strategy-proofness⇒
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P ) =
∑
x∈{a,b}∪B∪D
PS2x(P
′)
⇒ 1
n
+
|B|
n− 1 +
1
n− 1 +
|D¯1| − |B|n−1 − 1n−1
n
+
|D\D¯1|
n− 1
=
1
n− 1 +
|B|
n− 1 +
1− 1n−1 − |B|n−1
n− 1 +
|D¯1| − |B|n−1 −
1− 1
n−1−
|B|
n−1
n−1
n
+
|D\D¯1|
n− 1
⇒(1− n)|B| = 0 : contradiction.
Case 4: r1(P˜0, C) ∈ D and B = ∅.
In this caseAt1 = {a}. We use the same preferences and profiles as in Case 3 except a small
change in P0: D is ranked above b.
P˜0 : · · · · · · 
A(t−1)∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
a  D1  C\D1︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 c  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At2
 b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂At1
 · · · · · ·  · · · · · ·
P0 : · · · · · · 
=At1︷︸︸︷
a 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
D¯1  D\D¯1  b  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P¯0 : · · · · · · 
=At2︷ ︸︸ ︷
b  · · ·D · · · 
=At1︷︸︸︷
a  · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At1
 c · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
=At2
 · · · · · ·
P = (P˜0, P2, P3, · · · , Pn) and P ′ = (P˜1, P¯2, P3, · · · , Pn)
PS(P ) : a D b
1 : 1
n
|D¯1|
n
0
2 · · ·n : 1
n
|D¯1|
n
+ |D\D¯1|
n−1
1
n−1
For P , all agents equally share a. Then they equally share D¯1. After that agent 1 consumes
c if C\D1 = ∅ and C\D1 if otherwise and all the others equally share D\D¯1 and then b.
PS(P ′) :
a D b
1 : 1n−1
|D¯1|
n−1 0
2 : 0 0 |D¯1|n−1 +
|D\D¯1|
n−2 +
1− |D¯1|
n−1−
|D\D¯1|
n−2
n−1
3 · · ·n : 1n−1 |D¯1|n−1 + |D\D¯1|n−2
1− |D¯1|
n−1−
|D\D¯1|
n−2
n−1
For P ′, all agents other than 2 equally share a and during they do this agent 2 consumes
b. After a being exhausted, agents other than 2 equally share D¯1 and agent 2 still consumes
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b. It’s evident that D¯1 is exhausted faster. After that agent 1 consumes c if C\D1∅ and C\D1
if otherwise, agent 3 to n equally share D\D¯1, and agent 2 still consumes b. It’s evident that
D\D¯1 is exhausted faster. After that, agents 3 to n join agent 2 in consuming b so they equally
share the remaining share of b.
Now we have a contradiction against sd-strategy-proofness:
sd-strategy-proofness⇒
∑
x∈{a,b}∪D
PS2x(P ) =
∑
x∈{a,b}∪D
PS2x(P
′)
⇒ 1
n
+
|D¯1|
n
+
|D\D¯1|
n− 1 +
1
n− 1
=
|D¯1|
n− 1 +
|D\D¯1|
n− 2 +
1− |D¯1|n−1 − |D\D¯1|n−2
n− 1
⇒(n− 1)2 = −|D¯1| : contradiction.
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